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Fragmented Ethnopolitical Social
Representations of a Territorial Peace
Agreement: The Mindanao Peace
Talks
Cristina Jayme Montiel, Judith M. de Guzman and Ma. Elizabeth J. Macapagal
Ateneo de Manila University, Philippines

T

his article examines fractures in the social representations of a contested peace agreement in the
longstanding territorial conflict of Mindanao. We compared representational structures and discourses
about the peace talks among Muslims and Christians. Study One used an open-ended survey of 420
Christians and Muslims from two Mindanao cities identified with different Islamised tribes, and employed
the hierarchical evocation method to provide representational structures of the peace agreement. Study
Two contrasted discourses about the Memorandum of Agreement between two Muslim liberation fronts
identified with separate Islamised tribes in Mindanao. Findings show unified Christians’ social representations about the peace agreement. However, Muslims’ social representations diverge along the faultlines
of the Islamised ethnic groups. Findings are examined in the light of ethnopolitical divides that emerge
among apparently united nonmigrant groups, as peace agreements address territorial solutions. Research results are likewise discussed in relation to other tribally contoured social landscapes that carry
hidden, yet fractured ethnic narratives embedded in a larger war storyline.
Keywords: Mindanao, territorial conflict, ethnic identities, peace talks, social representations, hierarchical
evocation method

The southern island of Mindanao in the Philippines has
been the politico-military arena of a longstanding territorial conflict (Bertrand, 2000; Buendia, 2005) often
described as a Muslim–Christian clash (Milligan, 2001;
Tan, 2000). However, Mindanao is not only the Philippine hotbed of territorial conflict, it is also a region in
which several peace initiatives have taken place. During the Marcos regime, and especially after the People
Power Revolution in 1986 ushered in a new democracy, different Philippine presidents have attempted to
establish peace in Mindanao. In 2008, a peace agreement called the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
was signed by the peace panels of the Philippine government and the Moro International Liberation Front
(MILF).
The MOA acknowledged two basic rights of the Moro
people — identity and land. The peace agreement asserted
the birthright of all Moros and indigenous peoples of Mindanao to claim their identities as Bangsamoros, delineated
territorial boundaries that belonged to the Bangsamoro,
and created the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity to hold

authority over these defined territories. The public announcement of the MOA triggered a series of peaceful and
armed protests among Christians, and counter-protests
among Moro-associated forces. The Supreme Court eventually junked the peace agreement, and the Philippine
president fired the government peace panel that she herself had constituted.
This recent peace fiasco likewise called attention to
divisions among Muslims. With this recent unsuccessful
attempt to establish peace in Mindanao, we investigated
the nature of the psychological fractures within the Muslim front. We looked at how different Islamised groups
in Mindanao made sense of the Memorandum of Agreement. However, as social psychologists who are Christians,
we reflexively acknowledge our perceptive limitations as
we attempted to understand political meanings held by
two different Islamised tribes in what has been labelled a
Muslim–Christian conflict. We viewed our research question through the lens of social representations theory,
because this theory lends itself well to illuminating the
subjective landscape of social conflict.
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Social Representations Theory

Social representations refer to shared knowledge about
a social object. Such shared knowledge is socially constructed by group members who interact with each other
(Moscovici, 1988). Social representations become powerful psychological realities in the public minds of members of a social group, and fuel collective group behaviour
(Montiel, 2010). Social representations turn particularly
dynamic when something new and unknown is introduced to a group, and as the group makes sense of this
social novelty (Sarrica & Contarello, 2004). In our study,
this novel social concept was the Memorandum of Agreement for peace in Mindanao.
Social representations theory further identifies two
group-based psychological processes involved in collective meaning-making, the processes of objectification and
anchoring (Philogene & Deaux, 2001). Objectification is
concerned with transforming the abstract, in this case the
peace agreement, into something concrete. Readily available information are selected and simplified (Abric, 1996).
On the other hand, anchoring is the process of integrating
this new information within a system of familiar categories. People attach labels (e.g., Muslim–Christian conflict) to the unfamiliar phenomenon (peace agreement),
making possible the absorption of new information to an
old setting which generates a system of interpretation and
offers a framework for determining behaviour.
We posit that the Mindanao conflict was historically
anchored on religious categories owing largely to political
labelling by Spanish and American colonisers. The following section explains how the label ‘Muslim–Christian
conflict’ evolved from a history of Mindanao marked by
Christian foreign intrusions and Muslim resistance. We
then discuss the ethnic contours of Islamised tribes and
link this to divided social representational anchorings of
a territorial peace agreement. We further argue that during peace talks, social representations of territorial agreements are anchored not only along religious lines, but
also along ethnic contours among the nonmigrant landattached groups.
Historical Anchoring: Using Religious Labels to Make Sense
About Subverting Muslim-populated Mindanao

Islam reached Mindanao sometime in the 10th century or
at the latest by the 14th century, through Arab traders going to China from the Arabian Peninsula (Frake, 1998;
Majul, 1973). The Arabian traders travelled through
Malaysia, Mindanao, and other parts of the Philippine
archipelago, to reach China. Islam entered and settled
in Mindanao without any invasion or conquest involved
among the local people of Mindanao (Frake, 1998).
The first religious label in the context of armed conflict
emerged in the 16th century when the Spanish colonial
forces repeatedly and unsuccessfully attempted to conquer the island of Mindanao which was, at that time,
largely populated by Islamised tribes. The 16th century
38

Spanish colonisers called the local Mindanao population Moro, the same name the Spaniards used for their
Muslim enemies in Spain, the Moors (Frake, 1998). However, the Islamised tribes did not call themselves Moros
during the Spanish times. Note that the label Moro was a
religious category connoting outstanding fierceness during combat. By the close of the 19th century, Spain ceded
the Philippine Islands to America. During America’s control over the Philippines in the first half of the 20th century, religious categories were again used in Mindanao,
but the narrative shifted from military positioning by the
Spaniards to economic positioning under American control. Mindanao Christians were largely favoured to own
bigger tracts of land, through a law that structured the
distribution of public land in Mindanao.
The Public Land Act or the Commonwealth Act 141
of 1936 used the religious labels ‘Christians’ and ‘nonChristians’. The Public Land Act allowed a Christian to
buy a maximum of 144 hectares of land while a nonChristian could only acquire not more than four hectares
(Montiel, de Guzman, Inzon, & Batistiana, 2010). Hence
under America’s colonial influence, economic dispossession of Muslim Mindanaoans was implemented through
the religious label of ‘non-Christian’.
The above examples demonstrate how the Muslim–
Christian religious anchoring was evoked in colonial
narratives of conflict in Mindanao. However, these religious categorisations were not initiated by Muslims in
Mindanao, but by Christian Spaniards, Americans, and
their Filipino allies, in attempts to conquer Islamised tribes
in Mindanao through military and economic strategies.
Only in the recent past have the Mindanao Muslims
claimed the label ‘Moro’ for themselves (Frake, 1998).
They have done so in the context of their politico-military
territorial struggle in Mindanao against the Christiandominated Republic of the Philippines. When the Mindanao war exploded in the early 1970s, the organisation
that spearheaded the struggle for territorial rights against
the Philippine government was the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). By the 1980s a second politicomilitary group for territorial independence/autonomy in
Mindanao likewise turned more politically visible, under
the banner Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Both
the MNLF and MILF have reclaimed the name ‘Moro’, reviving the image of fierce fighters for independence against
foreign intruders.
Both liberation groups say that they are fighting for an
independent/autonomous Bangsamoro or Moro Nation.
Hence, the marginalised groups evoke a religious anchoring in the conversation about the Mindanao conflict. Their
battle cry is a religious one, and is defined by the use of
Moro in the names of the two primary liberation groups
in Mindanao, and also by the expressed goal of both organisations which is the attainment of the Bangsamoro
or the Moro nation. Even as the public discourse now
moves from conflict to peacemaking, the same religious
categories of war continue to be evoked in the Mindanao
JOURNAL OF PACIFIC RIM PSYCHOLOGY
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peace agreement. This is illustrated in the language used in
the peace agreement (i.e., Memorandum of Agreement or
MOA) to resolve territorial contentions in Mindanao. The
MOA document explicitly recognises ‘the birthright of all
Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify
themselves and be accepted as Bangsamoros’. This call for
Bangsamoro identity and homeland once more signifies
a religious labeling. We ask however, if pragmatic peacemaking and talks about land sharing evoke ethnopolitical
anchoring in addition to religious Muslim–Christian
anchoring.

Fragmented Social Representations of a Territorial Peace
Agreement Among the Nonmigrant Groups

Ethnopolitical groups define themselves by some combination of common ancestry, shared history, language, and
valued cultural traits (Gurr & Moore, 1997). Individuals
who share a common descent and set of ancestors tend to
share proximal space. Because ethnic groups live within
defined territorial boundaries (Chandra, 2006), territorial conflict and peacebuilding efforts need to consider
ethnopolitical faultlines as well (Harnischfeger, 2004). We
predicted that such ethnopolitical contours existed not
only as demographic and historical facts, but also as psychological spaces of fragmented subjective landscapes as
well.
In the context of the Mindanao territorial conflict,
territory is closely associated with ethnopolitical groups
(Buendia, 2005). Tribal groups in Mindanao were present
even before the arrival of Islam in Mindanao. At around
the time Islam arrived in Mindanao through commercial
traders, two dominant yet territorially distanced tribes had
risen to politico-economic superiority and had formed
two sultanates. These were the Tausugs in Jolo (Southwestern Mindanao) and the Maguindanao/Maranao tribes
in Central Mindanao (Frake, 1998). Both Tausugs and
Maguindanaoans/Maranaos lived in ethnic societies glued
together by tribal loyalties, languages, kinship ties, and
territorial spaces defined even before the coming of Islam.
Maguindanaoans and Maranaos live closer to each other,
interact more often, and are friendlier to each other than
to the Tausugs. Henceforth, for parsimonious reading, we
refer to the Maguindanao/Maranao ethnic groups as the
Maguindanaoans.
Although both Islamised tribes had historically spearheaded resistance movements against Christian colonial
and domestic forces, both Tausugs and Maguindanaoans
remained relatively unaware of the Other Islamised tribe.
Both ethnic groups did not relate with each other frequently, because they were spatially separated and the
defence of their lands only required local rather than
Mindanao-wide efforts. They could not communicate
with each other because they did not share a common
language. They possessed two distinct tribal languages,
with each language incomprehensible to the other tribe
(Frake, 1998).

After the 1960s, the term Moro was claimed by the liberation movements among the Islamised tribes. The leading ethnic groups formed two distinct politico-military
organisations, with the Tausugs consolidating under the
banner of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF),
and the Maguindanaoans rallying under the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) (Bertrand, 2000; Buendia, 2005;
Frake, 1998). Bangsamoro (Moro nation) became a battle cry for the various Muslim liberation groups. But the
singular call for a Bangsamoro did not reflect operational
unity between the MNLF and the MILF.
The term Moro was used primarily as a linguistic tool to
distinguish Islamised tribes from the Christian world. The
religious label bound Muslim Mindanaoans only when
they engaged in macro political conversations with Christians. As Kreuzer (2005) emphasised, ‘Bangsamoro . . .
unifies the various Moro groups only to a small degree. It is
relevant politically in order to be heard by the Philippine
government or the international donor community . . .
In terms of content, the bands are weak, the Muslims see
themselves as members of their clans and ethnic group,
and only secondary as Muslims’ (p. 22). Thus, even if
the nonmigrant group, the Muslims, claimed Bangsamoro,
they remained ethnopolitically fragmented.
As a peace process emerges out of the rubble of a
centuries-old conflict between Christians and Muslims,
the peace narrative needs to address issues of territorial dominion. Interestingly, the central linguistic tool for peace
talks fuses territory and ethnicity. The term ‘ancestral domain’ was the most contentious topic during the 2008
failed peace talks between the Philippine government and
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. Note that the label ‘ancestral domain’ describes control over territory (domain)
that is associated with ethnic descent (ancestral).
As talk about the Memorandum of Agreement arises
in the public sphere of conflicted Mindanao, how do
different Mindanao groups make sense of this novel social object? Would representational anchorings about the
peace agreement reflect the religious divide of a so-called
Muslim–Christian conflict? A deeper question then arises
about whether two nonmigrant and physically separated
Islamised tribes can share a common understanding about
one peace agreement. This question becomes crucial because bilateral peace talks assume that shared knowledge
about a peace memorandum would be divided between
Christians and Muslims, but unified within each of these
groups.
Moscovici (1988) identified three ways by which representations interface with intergroup relations. Hegemonic
representations are shared by all members of a society and
appear to be uniform. Emancipated representations can
be observed when social groups share similar representations, but highlight different aspects of these representations. Polemic representations, on the other hand, are
antagonistic and arise during social conflict. These representations are evoked during social controversy and
provide the subjective landscape of intergroup conflicts
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Table 1
Survey Sites Reflect the Political Duality of Islamised Tribes in the Mindanao Peace Conversation
Survey Site
Cotabato City

Types of Political Dualities
Dominant Islamised tribe in survey site
Moro Liberation Front associated with each site
Peace agreements (with the Christian-dominated Philippine
government) supported by each liberation front
Label of claimed Mindanao territory used in the peace agreement

Maguindanaoan
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
Memorandum of Agreement on
Ancestral Domain or MOA-AD
Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE)

(Montiel & de Guzman, 2011). They tend to be contradictory and contested, as members of different social groups
dispute the social meanings of a particular social object.
We predicted polemic representational anchoring
about the Memorandum of Agreement, not only across
the religious divide but also among the Islamised tribes.
We expected polemic social representations of the peace
agreement only among the nonmigrant Islamised groups
rather than the Christian settler group, because the former
carry tribal loyalties beyond an Islamic religion, and are
attached to the contested territory. In territorial conflicts,
ethnopolitical anchoring may be evoked more passionately by groups who have had centuries-old attachments
to the contested land, rather than by the migrant or settler
groups. Hence we did not expect any fractures in the social
representations of the peace agreement among Christians.

Ethnopolitical Social Representation of a
Peace Agreement: Two Studies
We ran two studies that asked the questions: Do social
representations about the Memorandum of Agreement
divide along the tribal faultlines of the Islamised groups?
On the other hand, are social representations about the
peace agreement homogeneous among Christians?
Study One surveyed college students and staff in selected territories of Mindanao associated with the Tausug
and Maguindanao Islamised tribes. This study compared
social representations of the peace agreement across religion and territory. According to Abric (1996, 2001), social
representations have a stable central element called the
central core, and more peripheral changeable elements.
The central core is the main element because it determines the structure of the representation and verifies the
relevance of the representation as whole. We used Abric’s
(2008) hierarchical evocation method to provide representational structures and identify central cores. Each group’s
representational central core was described, to find out
if central cores about the peace agreement varied across
groups.
Study Two used media analysis to identify social representations (Wagner et al., 1999) about the peace agreement. In the second study, we collected and analysed
public utterances about the contested peace agreement by
two ethnically identified Muslim liberation organisations,
the Maguindanaoan-dominated Moro Islamic Liberation
40

Zamboanga City
Tausug
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)
1996 Final Peace Agreement
Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM)

Front and the Tausug-led Moro National Liberation Front
(Betrand, 2000; Buendia, 2005; Frake, 1998). Study Two
presents competing public storylines about the Memorandum of Agreement, as advanced by these two ethnicallydifferent Muslim resistance groups.
Study One: Structure of the Social Representations of the
Memorandum of Agreement Across Religious and Territorial
Groups

We ran our survey in two research sites with distinct Islamised populations: (1) Cotabato City, which is populated by the Muslim Maguindanaoan group; and (2)
Zamboanga City, wherein Tausugs are the dominant Islamised tribe (National Statistics Office, 2002). We note
at this point that the Maguindanaoans exert influence in
the MILF whereas the Tausugs are known to be in control of the MNLF. Table 1 summarises the ethnopolitical
duality of these two research sites, the Islamised tribes
within these territories, and their alignments in Muslim
liberation groups.
Our sampling design consisted of a 2 × 2 matrix, with
participants categorised according to religion (Christian
or Muslim) and territory (Cotabato or Zamboanga). We
surveyed 420 participants from the Notre Dame University
in Cotabato City (n = 193) and the Ateneo de Zamboanga
University in Zamboanga City (n = 227). Both sampled
universities were highly recognised private schools in their
respective territories, and had produced regional leaders
from their respective academic institutions. The Cotabato
student sample consisted of 94 Christians and 99 Muslims. The Zamboanga sample had both students and staff
respondents, with 144 Christians and 83 Muslims. Data
collection did not pose any problem in both sample sites
because we had personal contacts in both academic institutions. Further, at the time of data collection, the first
author was a visiting professor at the Ateneo de Zamboanga University.
Survey Instrument and Data Analysis

The survey explored local people’s social representations
of the 2008 peace agreement. We asked participants to
mark their position in relation to the following statements:
(a) I am for the signing of the MOA (Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain), (b) I am not for the signing of
the MOA, and (c) Others, please describe. We then computed for the percentage of participants who indicated
JOURNAL OF PACIFIC RIM PSYCHOLOGY
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Table 2
Representational Central-Core Elements of the Memorandum of Agreement, Across Religions and Territories
Territory
Zamboanga (Tausug)*
Religion

Christians

Cotabato (Maguindanaoan)*

Muslim control and domination (18.83%, AEO = 1.66)**
Territory, land and ancestral domain (11.73%, AEO = 1.68)

Muslims

Territory, land and ancestral domain (18.33%, AEO = 1.61)

Territory, land and ancestral domain (17.34%, AEO =
1.33)
Separation of Mindanao from the Philippines (16.18%,
AEO = 1.57)
Peace, order and development (15.61%, AEO = 1.81)
Muslim control and domination (11.56%, AEO = 1.90)
Muslim rights, freedom and self-governance (31.36%,
AEO = 1.81)

Feelings of uncertainty, confusion, mistrust, anger and fear
(18.33%, AEO = 1.94)
*Note: * The terms within parentheses refer to the name of the Islamised tribes in these particular territories.
** The percentages refer to the frequency of occurrence of each theme. AEO stands for the average evocation order or the average rank of each theme, where 1 = most immediately
evoked and 3 = less immediately evoked.

their support for the signing of the MOA, across religious
and territorial groups.
We also utilised a free word association task to investigate how participants socially represented the peace
agreement. In this task, we asked participants to imagine
themselves conducting a lecture about the peace accord.
We then asked them to state the three most important
features of the agreement that they would include in their
lecture. We adopted a structural approach in analysing the
data from the free word association task.
The structure of social representations may be studied
through a quantitative method known as the hierarchical
evocation method (HEM; Abric, 2008; Wachelke, 2008).
Among other things, HEM identifies the central core of a
social representation. The central core consists of the main
elements of a social representation; it is ‘stable, coherent,
consensual, and considerably influenced by the group collective memory and its system of values’ (Abric, 1996,
p. 79).
Operationally, HEM identifies the central core of a
social representation by examining two criteria — the
frequency and the order of evocation of a representational element. Thus, central core elements refer to the
responses that are mentioned more frequently (high frequency) and more immediately (low average evocation order) (Abric, 2008; Roland-Levy & Berjot, 2009; Wachelke,
2008; Wolter, Gurrieri & Sorribas, 2009).
Our data analysis using the hierarchical evocation
method followed a two-stage process. First, we examined
the responses to the free word association task using thematic analysis, a method that allowed us to identify meaningful patterns in the data (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Because
our aim was to identify central core elements — defined
as those themes with high frequency and low evocation
order, we excluded some themes that had significantly low
frequencies (less than 5% of total responses; J. Wachelke,
personal communication, May 7, 2012).
We then computed for the average frequency and the
average evocation order of each theme. Because of the
unequal group sizes, we utilised the percentage of occurrence of each theme. Readers may refer to Abric (2008)

and Wachelke (2008) for more procedural details about
the use of the hierarchical evocation method in social representations research.
Results: Christian Hegemony and Muslim Fragmentation in the
Social Representations of the Memorandum of Agreement

Our findings show Christian hegemony and Muslim fragmentation in the social representations of the 2008 peace
agreement. Figure 1 illustrates the patterns of support for
the peace agreement across religions and territories. Our
results showed that Christian participants from both locations opposed the peace accord. Table 2 presents the representational elements of the central core across religious
and territorial groups. Specifically, our findings showed
that some of the central core elements of the Christian
representation of the MOA were shared across territories
while other elements appeared to be unique only to Christian participants from one territory.
In particular, Christian participants from Cotabato
and Zamboanga made sense of the peace agreement in
relation to the following central core elements: (1) Muslim control and domination in Mindanao, and (2) issues
about territory, land, and ancestral domain. However, it is
important to note that the central core of the social representations held by Cotabato Christians included other
elements, such as the meanings of the peace agreement in
relation to peace, order, and development in Mindanao, as
well as issues related to the separation of Mindanao from
the Philippines. This indicates that although Christian
groups from Cotabato and Zamboanga held hegemonic
representations about the peace agreement, Christian participants from the former site may have a more complex
representation about this particular social object.
More importantly, our findings revealed ethnopolitical fragmentation between the two Muslim groups in
relation to the 2008 peace agreement. The majority of
Tausug Muslim respondents opposed the peace accord.
Interestingly, this Islamised group’s social representations
stood closer to those held by the Christian groups. Among
the Tausugs, the social meanings of the said peace accord
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Legends:

I am for the signing of the MOA

I am against the signing of the MOA.

Others

Figure 1
Public support/opposition to the Memorandum of Agreement across religious and territorial groups.

were linked to (1) issues about land, territory, and ancestral domain, and (2) feelings of uncertainty, confusion, mistrust, anger, and fear. In contrast, the majority of
Maguindanaoan Muslims supported the peace agreement.
Maguindanaoans socially represented the Memorandum
of Agreement as linked to Muslim rights, freedom, and
self-governance. The representational fracture between Islamised tribes shows Tausug Muslims emphasising negative emotions, and Maguindanaoan Muslims explaining
the peace agreement in a positive light. Table 3 lists down
the themes that comprised the representational core elements of each subgroup along with sample responses that
comprise each particular theme.
Study Two: Public Meanings of the Memorandum of Agreement
According to Two Ethnically-Different Muslim Liberation
Movements

Study One showed that Muslim participants from two different territories held fragmented representations about
the 2008 peace agreement. Building on this finding, we
further investigated the social meanings of this peace
agreement according to two ethnically different Muslim liberation movements — the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Moro National Liberation
Front (MNLF). Social representations can also be studied
by looking at the discourses that different social groups
hold about a particular social object (Wagner et al.,
1999).
42

To investigate the social representations of the 2008
peace agreement according to these two ethnopolitical
groups, we gathered news articles and accounts regarding this social object from the following sources: (1) the
internet version of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, the nation’s most widely circulated newspaper, and (2) the official website of the MILF Central Committee on Information. We collected data that were published from July
2008 to April 2009, corresponding to the period when
information about the peace accord first emerged in the
public sphere up to the period when the contentions about
the agreement started to subside. Through this process,
we accumulated 169 articles and accounts. Most of the
articles about the MOA involved the MILF, mainly because this liberation movement was the main proponent
of this peace agreement. Nevertheless, our dataset also included some key accounts highlighting the position of the
MNLF in relation to the controversial peace accord. We
then extracted statements and arguments about the peace
agreement that were issued by the MILF and the MNLF.
Finally, we read and re-read these key utterances to identify
the social meanings that these two ethnopolitical groups
ascribed to this particular peace accord.
Results: MILF-MNLF Polemical Representations about the
Memorandum of Agreement

Our findings showed that the two Muslim ethnopolitical groups — the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
JOURNAL OF PACIFIC RIM PSYCHOLOGY
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Table 3
Sample Responses per Theme Generated From the Free Evocation Task About the Memorandum of Agreement
Themes

Sample responses

Muslim control and domination

The Bangsamoro group are trying to take over ARMM.
Powers of the Muslim.
It extended the Muslim area.
The issue of possible Muslim domination.
Islam wants to be the most powerful.
The MILF will somehow try to dominate Mindanao (some parts).
Invasion of Islam.
Muslim domination in Mindanao.
The Bangsamoro wanted to occupy Mindanao.
Becoming Mindanao as the land for Muslim people only.
Forcefully claiming of Bangsamoro that Mindanao is the property of Muslims.

Territory, land and ancestral domain

Ancestral domain.
Territory.
Territorial limits and boundaries.
Taking back their land.
Land grabbing.
Ownership of land.
Bangsamoro homeland.
Division of land/geographic areas/barangays.
Inclusion of some barangays in the BJE.

Separation of Mindanao from Philippines

They will separate Mindanao from the Philippines.
Separation of Mindanao from Philippines.
Mindanao will be a country.
The independence of Mindanao.
Mindanao will be known as a country not just one part of the Philippines.
The economy of Mindanao is separated from the Philippines.

Peace, order and development

Peace between government and MILF.
Peace and order.
Stopping conflicts in the community.
It helps resolve conflict in Mindanao.
This is about the resolution of the problem in Mindanao for peace implementation.
For the betterment of Mindanao.
Unity of all Christians and Muslims.
Peace in Mindanao.
Development.
To have peace and justice for the people of Mindanao.
A solution for conflict.
It will give a long-lasting peace in Mindanao.

Feelings of uncertainty, confusion, mistrust, fear and anger

Not to be trusted.
Anger.
Scary.
I feel bad about it because suddenly popped out without info.
It made the Zamboanguenos panic.
Confusion among people caused by MOA.
What will happen if we will be a part of it?
What must have gone to the government’s mind that they commit that stupidity?
The fear of what will happen to us.
What will happen to us if they are able to get our properties?
Christians will be afraid to stay in Zamboanga

Muslim rights, freedom and self-governance

Attain independence for Moros.
Muslim Mindanaon are liberated.
The right to Bangsamoro.
Independence will be given to Muslim people of Mindanao.
It has something to do with the independence of Muslim Mindanaoans.
Implementation of Islamic laws.
Muslim people will take a chance to lead in their own country.
Bangsamoro will be given leadership rights to rule Mindanao.
Bangsamoro republic
Right of self-determination.
Equal rights for Muslims.

and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) — held
polemic representations about the 2008 peace agreement.
The social representations of the said peace accord varied

between these two groups in terms of four main points: (1)
the social and political consequences of the peace agreement, (2) the mechanism that each group proposed to
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Table 4
Ethnopolitical Fragmentation Between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)
Main points of polemic

Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)

Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)

Social and political
consequences of the 2008
peace agreement

Representation:
The 2008 peace agreement will lead to peace and
development in Mindanao.
Sample statement:
The peace agreement is a key to ‘finally address the
Bangsamoro problem and the conflict in Mindanao’.

Mechanisms to address the
Mindanao conflict

Representation:
The Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) is the preferred
mechanism to resolve the Mindanao conflict.

Representation:
The 2008 peace agreement will lead to armed fighting
and violence in Mindanao.
Sample statement:
The signing of the peace agreement can ‘spark a new
wave of violence and armed confrontations in
Mindanao’.
Representation:
The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
is the main instrument to implement reforms and
promote peace in Mindanao.
Sample statement:
The ARMM is the ‘primary and most potent tool for
implementing political, socio-economic and military
reforms as stated in MNLF’s peace agreement with
the government’.
Representation:
In contrast to the MILF, the MNLF is the government’s
ally in ending the hostilities in Mindanao brought
about by the 2008 peace agreement.

Sample statement:
The BJE will ‘exercise power or authority over the
natural resources within its territorial jurisdiction’ and
thus address the roots of the conflict in Mindanao.
Position about the armed
conflict following the 2008
peace agreement

Suggestions for the future peace
process

Suggestions for the future peace
process

Representations:
Because the government reneged on its commitment to
the peace agreement, armed struggle remains as an
option to advance the aspirations of the Bangsamoro
people.
Government military troops initiated the armed fighting
by harassing MILF troops.
Sample statements:
‘War is among the options. It is part of the struggle. The
MILF is determined to continue that struggle.’
‘The militiamen in these areas harassed MILF troops in
nearby villages and that started all of these.’
Representations:
The peace agreement between the Philippine
government and the MNLF has failed to address the
Mindanao conflict; hence, the 2008 peace agreement
should be used as the framework for the future peace
process.
Sample statements:
The peace agreement between the Philippine
government and the MNLF was ‘not implemented
satisfactorily years after the signing’.
The 2008 peace agreement is ‘the only peaceful way to
solve the Moro Problem’.

address the Mindanao conflict, (3) the positions that each
group took in relation to the armed conflict that followed
the controversy over the peace agreement, and (4) each
group’s suggestions on how to move the peace process forward. Table 4 shows the polemical themes that emerged
from the collected utterances of these two ethnopolitical groups, along with sample statements from each
group.
As the main proponent of the agreement, the MILF
argued that the peace accord would lead to peace and development in the Mindanao region. In contrast, the MNLF
cautioned that the agreement would precede armed fighting and violence in Mindanao. Polemic representations
of the peace agreement were also observed in relation
to the mechanisms that each group proposed to address
the conflict in Mindanao. On the one hand, the MILFsponsored peace agreement recommended the creation of
Bangsamoro Juridical Entities to enable the Bangsamoro
people to exercise governance over their ancestral do44

Sample statements:
The MNLF is willing to ‘contribute towards the
restoration of peace’ in Mindanao.
The MNLF is a ‘partner of the national government in
the implementation of peace and development for
many, many years until today’.
Representations:
The peace agreement between the Philippine
government and the MNLF provides the best possible
solution to the Bangsamoro problem.

Sample statements:
The peace agreement between the Philippine
government and the MNLF is ‘the best under the
present circumstances’.
‘The 1996 MNLF-GRP accord should take precedence
before any other agreements.’

main and thus provide a solution to the conflict in the
region. On the other hand, the MNLF reiterated the role
of the existing Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) as the primary mechanism to implement the
necessary reforms to promote peace in Mindanao. In addition, the MNLF also strongly opposed the inclusion of
ARMM provinces in the territories claimed by the MILF
in the Memorandum of Agreement.
A third point of divergence between the MILF and
the MNLF involved the position that each ethnopolitical
group took in relation to the armed fighting that erupted
during the social controversy about the 2008 peace agreement. For the MILF, armed struggle remained to be one of
the options to advance the aspirations of the Bangsamoro
people. The MILF also argued that their field commanders
engaged in armed confrontations with the government
only as a defensive move. In contrast, the MNLF positioned itself as the Philippine government’s ally by calling
for a cessation of armed hostilities.
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Finally, as the controversy over the peace accord subsided, the MILF and the MNLF also held polemic representations about the possible avenues to move the Mindanao peace process forward. According to the MILF, the
peace agreement between the Philippine government and
the MNLF had failed to address the roots of the Mindanao
conflict. Hence, the MILF-backed 2008 peace agreement
represented the most effective tool to push the peace process forward. The MNLF strongly countered this assertion and instead highlighted the centrality of the previous
peace agreements that it had negotiated with the Philippine government, citing how these accords represented
the best possible option to end the Mindanao conflict.
Summary: Highlights of Results

Do the social representations of a territorial peace agreement vary in relation to ethnopolitical fragmentation between Muslim nonmigrant groups in Mindanao? Our
findings from Study One showed that whereas Christian
settlers held hegemonic representations about the 2008
peace agreement, Muslim nonmigrants from two distinct
territories, Cotabato and Zamboanga, held fragmented
representations in relation to this particular social object.
Study Two further substantiates these findings by examining the social meanings which two Muslim ethnopolitical groups — the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) — ascribed to the 2008 peace agreement. Results supported
the patterns of Muslim ethnopolitical fragmentation observed in Study One, as these two resistance groups illustrated polemic representations about the Memorandum
of Agreement.
We point out that both studies showed how the Tausugassociated Muslims positioned themselves along with the
Christians’ contradictory stance against the peace agreement, leaving only the Maguindanaoan Muslims supporting the controversial peace proposition. Hence, the findings of our two studies provide evidence for the need to
study ethnopolitical dynamics within a single religious
category during the negotiation of territorial peace agreements in a so-called Muslim–Christian conflict.
Discussion
Using social representations theory as a conceptual lens,
this research argued for representational fragmentations
within the Muslim nonmigrant group rather than the
Christian settler group, because different Islamised tribes
carried ancestral attachments to separate territorial tracts
included in the peace agreement. Research findings
showed internal fractures along ethnic lines especially as
the peace process progressed. From a shared religious category of the nondominant group Muslim or Moro, antagonistic ethnopolitical faultlines associated with particular
ancestral domains emerged.
In the Mindanao conflict, war was encoded in the language of religious categories. Hence, at the peace bargain-

ing table, the Christian government thought about one
Muslim Front and a single unified Bangsamoro. But there
was a different psychological picture on the other side of
the bargaining table. Mindanao Muslims may not have
seen all Islamised tribes as having equal collective rights
over the territorial spoils of war. Fragmented ethnopolitical faultlines emerged as political talk veered away from
an anti-Christian struggle to the sharing of power within
Bangsamoro.
Our research highlights the power of social representations to nuance meaning-making within bigger social
groups who are involved in peace talks. The conventional
way of analysing conflict and peacemaking is through
broader categories such as religion. But based on our results, viewing underlying ethnopolitical contours of larger
conflict-based categories may add to a deeper understanding of a territorial peace process. Our results concur with
other research findings that Muslims have an identity divide (Buendia, 2005; Frake, 1998). Bertrand (2000), for
instance, observed that ‘divisions among Muslims have
reduced support for the peace agreement’ (p. 49). In territorial conflicts, larger or deeper divides may emerge once
the peace talks address territorial issues.
What are the practical implications of our findings? We
first relate our results to peacebuilding in Mindanao, and
then elucidate on implications in other tribally contoured
conflicts in the Pacific Rim.
One implication is that understanding the nature of
peace in Mindanao entails looking beyond a conventional clash-of-religions narrative. The Mindanao conflict
is popularly labeled as a Muslim–Christian conflict. Attempts at peacebuilding include formation and training
projects that widen cultural understandings and increase
tolerance of each other’s religions. But underneath the
religious umbrella of the Islamised nonmigrant and displaced group, there are tribal contours that turn salient as
peace talks discuss territorial dominion over land ceded
by the dominant Christian state. Hence, peace discussions
should include not only whether particular spaces would
fall under Christians or Muslims, but also how the territory ceded to the Muslims would be shared and managed
by the different Islamised tribes.
The recent peace fiasco of 2008 demonstrates
how Islamised Tausugs positioned themselves against
a Memorandum of Agreement that was backed by
the Maguindanaoan-associated Moro Islamic Liberation
Front. For an explanation, we look at intertribal political
competition. The reason behind the Tausugs’ criticism of
the peace agreement may have stemmed from a collective
Tausug desire for tribal control of any Moro Nation that
would arise after the peace agreement. If the 2008 peace
agreement had been signed, the Maguindanaoans would
dominate the new Bangsamoro. This was probably what
many Islamised Tausugs were avoiding as they criticised
the 2008 peace agreement.
Long-lasting peacebuilding in Mindanao would entail
addressing the politico-ethnic contours of Islamised tribes
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in the new Bangsamoro. However, the history of Mindanao
peacemaking in the Philippines does not seem to recognise the underlying tribal contours. The discourse during
peace talks is only about a single Muslim territory referred
to, across recent history, as the Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) associated with the Tausugled Moro National Liberation Front, or the Bangsamoro
Juridical Entity (BJE) in the 2008 failed peace agreement
with the Maguindanao-influenced Moro Islamic Liberation Front. Understandably, both peace instruments did
not mobilise a united Muslim front because support for or
against the peace agreement fractured along tribal lines.
Assuming, however, that the peace discourse recognised ethnic coagulations, what would be the practical
consequence on peacebuilding in Mindanao? We see two
options. First, instead of a single Bangsamoro political
entity, discussions may veer toward the creation of two
Bangsamoro entities or substates, associated with the two
dominant Islamised tribes in Mindanao.
A second option would be to open the doors to
Muslim-based third party interventions that would encourage the liberation movements associated with the
Tausugs and the Maguindanaoans to work together and
craft the power-sharing contours of a single Bangsamoro
state. Perhaps the superordinate goal of successfully getting back ancestral land now in the hands of Christians
can bring the Islamised tribes together toward a more unified front. Informal and unverified political rumours have
talked about the Organization of the Islamic Conference
(OIC) organising such meetings between the MNLF and
the MILF. For ethical and politico-psychological reasons,
however, it is worthwhile to mention that all three of us
authors are Christians who believe that such third party
interventions should not be initiated by the Christianassociated Philippine government or nongovernment organisations, as the issue is an internal matter among Islamised tribes.
Our research findings may likewise hold practical implications for other ethnically contoured contestations in
the Pacific Rim. In the North Atlantic, cultural melting
pots and multiculturalism are characterised by migrants
from different parts of the globe. In the Pacific Rim, however, cultural heterogeneity is marked by variations of
nonmigrant cultural groups whose ancestors have lived on
their lands for hundreds of years. Hence, tribal identities
in the Rim emerge during contestations about dominion
over territory and resources in a certain place.
We point out that a larger conflict storyline in the
Pacific Rim may actually hold invisible yet powerful tribal
contours which may emerge once the bigger enemy cedes
territorial control to the nondominant group. This may be
the future of peacebuilding in the so-called large conflict
between Christians and Muslims in Mindanao. There are
also other societies in the Pacific Rim that may likewise
need to attend to smaller tribal identities associated with
the nondominant group, once the bigger antagonist bows
out partially or completely from the contested territory.
46

Aside from the Mindanao conflict, we cite two other
social conflicts in Pacific Rim where tribal-based peacemaking issues may arise within the nondominant group,
as the major conflict with the primary dominant group
subsides. For example, the Aceh movement for independence from the Indonesian state has been fuelled by
Acehnese nationalism. Yet a closer look at the political
picture on the ground shows that the Acehnese nation is
composed not only of the Aceh tribe, but also of other
tribes (Schulze, 2003) that include the Gayonese, Alas,
Tamiang, Ulu Singkil, Kluet, Aneuk Jamee, and Simeulu
(McCulloch, 2005). In Papua New Guinea (PNG), the
Bougainville struggle for autonomy from the PNG state
has been marked with simultaneous intergroup struggles among the approximately 25 ethnolinguistic clusters
among Bougainvilleans (Hammond, 2011). Interestingly,
Bougainville has attended to its internal ethnic contours
by implementing a peace process that recognises its ethnic
variations and by developing a system of representation
that includes clan, village, and area council chiefs (Reagan,
1999).
Practical applications of our findings may likewise be
extended to regions beyond the Pacific Rim where there
are latent yet fractured ethnic narratives embedded in a
larger war storyline. This may be the case in the future of
countries that are tribally configured, such as Afghanistan,
Iraq, Libya, and Yemen. After a foreign enemy departs or
an authoritarian leader falls, tribes that do not share the
same ancestry, language, and territorial domains would
need to strike a final peaceful arrangement among themselves, as the war-and-peace conversation veers away from
a defensive armed struggle against an external enemy, to
sharing dominion over ethnically contoured territory. For
example, even as we write this article, there is news coming out of Libya claiming that rival tribes are violently
feuding over the coming polls, in a new democracy won
by a painful people’s struggle against the Gaddafi dictatorship 8 months ago (Davies, 2012). Indeed, the next-level
peace narratives in both territorial conflicts and democratic movements may need to be about tribal power sharing.
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